After the terrorist attack in Crocus: politicians and propagandists demand a tightening of migration policy. Could this really have prevented the attack? We're talking to migration researcher Salavat Abylkalikov — Meduza

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Immediately after the terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall, there was a sharp surge in xenophobia in Russia. Migrant workers from Tajikistan report increasing cases of aggression - not only at the everyday level , but also from security forces . At the same time, State Duma deputies began to propose limiting the entry of migrants into Russia, and former presidential candidate Vladislav Davankov took the initiative to deport them for the “smallest offense” and introduce digital control. Is Russian migration policy capable of ensuring security for the country (and not destroying the economy)? Meduza spoke about this with demographer Salavat Abylkalikov, a visiting researcher at Northumbria University in the UK and a CARA fellow .

— There is no exact data on what legal basis the alleged perpetrators of the terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall were in Russia. But the Russian authorities have already voiced several initiatives to tighten immigration policy. In your opinion, should the state react to such events in this way?

“It seems to me that initially the discussion [about the causes and consequences of the terrorist attack] both in Russian society and in government went in the wrong direction. I think that any terrorist attack is a failure of the intelligence services, because they should be primarily involved in preventing them. And if a terrorist attack occurs, by minimizing casualties. When intelligence services, instead of monitoring the situation [with terrorism], developing their network of agents, interacting with colleagues from other countries, are engaged in the fight against dissidents, this is a natural result.

It's not about migration as such. In any large country there are millions of migrants, but there are always only a few terrorists. And when there is talk about tightening migration policy or some kind of mass repression [against migrants], we are actually talking about collective punishment [of migrants]. Although specific individuals are to blame, and highly paid and authorized people should have worked with them. And they, apparently, were doing something wrong.

A separate issue is fire safety, evacuation possibilities, as it was all agreed upon. Together with the terrorist attack, in fact, there was a repetition of the tragedy in “Winter Cherry”. But this is not what is being discussed, but migration policy.

— Speaking more broadly, and not just in relation to the terrorist attack in Crocus City Hall, do you think the checks that migrants now undergo when entering Russia and receiving documents are sufficient to ensure safety? And is it even possible to pose the question this way?

“It seems to me that the “sieve” that stands at the border when checking migrants, and indeed everyone who enters the country, cannot be so small [to thoroughly check everyone]. Otherwise we will stop all our economic activities. It is simply impossible to check everything during border control.

And if every time you close the borders with the countries where terrorists come from, then paradoxically it will turn out that terrorist organizations, and not the multinational people of Russia through state authorities, will determine its foreign and domestic policy.

- But there are also checks when preparing documents - residence permits, work permits, and so on. How thorough are they? Is it easy to get around them?

— My practice shows that the more “control”, the more irresponsibility, chaos and corruption. Referring to the works of [migration specialist] Olga Chudinovskikh , I can say that, for example, the absolute majority of recipients of Russian citizenship [as a second] acquire it in an accelerated manner.

But still, I don’t think that the issue of terrorism and the issue of migrants obtaining Russian citizenship are so closely related. I believe that it is necessary to prevent the crimes themselves and imprison specific perpetrators, and not punish or repress everyone indiscriminately.

— How acute, in your opinion, is the problem of integrating migrants into Russian society? Has anything changed in recent years?

— In my opinion, issues of integration or adaptation of migrants are mostly left to chance. But at the same time, people mostly come to Russia from post-Soviet countries, and their integration requires less effort and resources - for example, many know Russian, although, of course, this becomes more difficult for younger generations. And the way of life in Tashkent or, say, Dushanbe is not so radically different from Russia.

— So the idea that there is a big problem with the integration of migrants in Russia is, rather, part of xenophobic rhetoric?

- Partly. But, of course, there are problems, it’s just that no one really deals with it. And it is unlikely that he will do so in the near future.

— In recent years, experts have noted that more and more citizens of Tajikistan are receiving Russian citizenship. Is this really true in comparison with immigrants from other post-Soviet countries? What is this connected with?

— Let's look at which post-Soviet countries migrants came to Russia from. At one time these were the Baltic countries, but now hardly anyone wants to come from there to the Russian Federation - the economic gap is growing and widening. Especially in Lithuania and Estonia. Belarus is close to a level of development comparable to Russia [for example, in terms of wages]. Previously numerous migrants from Moldova, thanks to the visa regime with the EU and the ease of obtaining Romanian passports, have largely reoriented towards the European Union. Azerbaijan itself began to grow rich in oil and gas. There are also Georgia and Armenia - but these are all [relatively] small countries.

So that leaves the Central Asian states. But Kazakhstan has also become rich, wages there are already almost higher than in Russia. Turkmenistan was isolated throughout the post-Soviet period. Uzbekistan, the largest country in the region [by population], still provides a lot of migrants, but at the same time, after the arrival of the new president [Shavkat Mirziyoyev], there were very serious reforms and rapid economic development [began]. So for many Uzbek citizens the question arises about whether it makes sense to go to Russia.

And only Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan remain - rather poor countries that can provide Russia with migrants. But people from Kyrgyzstan are less likely [than citizens of Tajikistan] to apply for Russian citizenship. Because thanks to the regulation of migration within the Eurasian Union , they can work in the Russian Federation without special permission.

At the same time, competition for migrants is intensifying among receiving countries - this also includes the European Union, Turkey, South Korea and others. So they will gradually attract migrants from Central Asia to themselves, and the attractiveness of Russia will decrease.

— In 2023, the influx of migrants to Russia fell to its minimum. Is this precisely because the economic attractiveness of Russia is decreasing, plus now migrants are at risk of being mobilized?

— The ruble exchange rate has dropped very much , especially compared to 2022. As a result, sending money home has become less profitable. Other factors may also play a role: reports that migrants could be sent to war may have frightened some. And the current information agenda [after the terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall] will also certainly have an impact.

— Since Russia’s economic attractiveness for migrants is declining, will their influx continue to decline?

— Migration, more than any other demographic process, depends on the economic situation. On the one hand, Russia’s economic problems and the weakening of the ruble will help reduce the migration influx. At the same time, against the backdrop of a shortage of personnel in the Russian labor market (and record low unemployment in the Russian Federation), the huge demand for labor is increasingly noticeable, so migrants actually face a dilemma: there is little money, but they can easily find a job; There will probably be discrimination, but there is no need to learn a new language - say, Korean, Arabic or English. Which side of the scale will tip the scale?

It still seems to me that over time, migration growth will greatly decrease, because new generations who have not had experience of migrating to Russia will probably initially decide to go to Turkey, the UAE, Qatar, South Korea or somewhere else.

— Taking into account the needs of the labor market for labor, could the Russian authorities do something to attract more migrants? And is this realistic?

“It’s hard to say what can be done here.” The best advice is to develop the Russian economy. You can, of course, introduce some special programs to simplify entry, but the question is not only how easy it is to come to Russia, but whether there will be people willing to come. And if they come, will they stay? And at the same time, the very logic of economic development pushes employers to attract migrants - they simply have no choice. And if we return to the terrorist attack, experience shows that the outbursts of xenophobia that such extreme events cause quickly fade away - we can recall, for example, the situation with migrants from Georgia during and immediately after the 2008 war.

Now, due to general instability and a difficult economic situation, people have a need to declare someone guilty. As a rule, it is easiest to blame those who are different from us - either in sexual preferences, or in views, religion, skin color, eye shape, language, and so on. And the latter are quite easy to identify. The war will contribute to the growth of crime in society - the price of human life has decreased. Disadvantaged people with combat experience will return to the country, and the level of intolerance will increase. And all this will also fuel hatred and xenophobia.

Interviewed by Margarita Lyutova